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Saule Omarova’s inquiry into whether Wall Street could be regu-
lated—or self-regulated—as a “community of fate”1
Perhaps, she suggests, strong command-and-control regulation is 
not the answer—or at least not the only part of the answer.  After all, 
Wall Street had a long preregulatory tradition of acting in concert to 
prevent financial panics.  Concerted action was not always successful, 
to be sure, but it was something that the original J.P. Morgan—not to 
mention today’s JPMorgan Chase—would find familiar. 
 is one way of ask-
ing how much we should reform the financial system after the recent 
financial crisis. 
Can Wall Street be induced to act in concert to forestall the next 
crisis?  Here, I think Omarova’s creative exploration of how self-
regulation might work offers promise, though I accept it with qualifi-
cations.  A self-regulated industry might work particularly well in the 
context of powerful, though not always prophetic, regulators that 
oversee finance, especially the Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve.2
 
†
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
  Regulators like these—agencies that possess “shotguns be-
1
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:  Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011). 
2
See generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal:  The Govern-
ment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (describing the gov-
ernment’s role in the aftermath of the financial crisis); David Zaring, Administration by 
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hind the door” for use in emergencies3
In this brief evaluation of Omarova’s article, I situate the piece in 
the emerging literature of financial crisis fixes; I explore what, exactly, 
regulation through a community of fate—her vision of a precondition 
for effective self-regulation—might mean for the industry; and I offer 
a modest critique of the argument that moderate self-regulation can 
solve the modern problems of global panics.  Creating the ideal form 
of a community of fate would be challenging.
 but also face real problems in 
keeping up with the latest innovations in financial engineering—
could have the right combination of abilities and needs to make in-
dustry self-supervision realistic and useful. 
4  But the task is not in-
superable, and if done right and in conjunction with some of the tra-
ditional substantive reform that Omarova herself thinks may be use-
ful,5
A number of proposals to fix the financial system have been in-
troduced in the media and literature, and some of them have involved 
quite stringent regulation.  Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller, 
for example, suggest creating a $1 trillion bailout fund that would be 
funded by the banks themselves to deal with the next crisis—a forced 
insurance scheme.
 then it could minimize the pain of the next panic. 
6  Simon Johnson and others go even further; they 
believe that the banks should be broken up through antitrust or hard-
asset caps.7
 
Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187 (2010) (discussing the extent of the Treasury Depart-
ment’s discretion and power in addressing the financial crisis). 
  Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chair and Ob-
3
The metaphor belongs to former SEC Chair (and later Supreme Court Justice) 
William O. Douglas, who said of self-regulation that “[g]overnment would keep the 
shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but 
with the hope it would never have to be used.”  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND 
FINANCE 82 (J. Allen ed. 1940).  For a discussion of this “shotgun,” see Toni Anne Puz, 
Note, Private Actions for Violations of Securities Exchange Rules:  Liability for Nonenforcement 
and Noncompliance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 610, 611, 612 n.19 (1988). 
4
As Omarova states, “[i]ndividual firms within the industry must realize the im-
portance of assuring collective survival through voluntary limitation of their otherwise 
unconstrained profit-seeking activities.”  Omarova, supra note 1, at 446. 
5
See id. at 483 (noting that “for an effective self-regulatory system to emerge and 
thrive, there must be a strong regulatory and supervisory framework in whose shadow 
such self-regulation operates”). 
6
See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:  Dodd-
Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
151, 155 (2011) (“The initial fund should be $1 trillion, indexed to an appropriate 
measure of financial sector growth. The Fund should be partly pre-funded by risk-
adjusted fees charged to large or systemically important financial firms.”). 
7
See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS:  THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 13 (2010) (“A central pillar of this reform must 
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ama advisor, has urged Congress to rationalize financial regulation by, 
among other things, consolidating it in one or two market regula-
tors8—a proposal former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson also 
pushed,9 but the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010 eschewed.10  
And although those who believe that we should learn to live with a 
boom-and-bust financial system have kept relatively quiet in propound-
ing proposals for fixing the system of financial regulation, retaining the 
old way of doing things is an alternative that cannot be discounted ei-
ther, given the apparent success and even the profitability of the ad hoc 
bailouts administered during the last financial crisis.11
I view Omarova’s approach as one that, at its most rigorous, might 
serve as a force multiplier for fans of stringent oversight, but also as 
one that is quite consistent with a laissez-faire approach.  Omarova ar-
gues that the financial industry may be well suited to police itself 
against crisis, especially if the alternative is a constant battle with a 
command-and-control government regulator.
 
12
 
be breaking up the megabanks that dominate our financial system and have the ability 
to hold our entire economy hostage.”).  Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz 
agrees.  See Joseph Stiglitz, America’s Socialism for the Rich, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2009, 8:00 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/12/america-corporate 
-banking-welfare (contending that “[w]e need to break up the too-big-to-fail banks”).  
Federal Reserve official Thomas Hoenig is also in agreement.  See Thomas M. Hoenig, 
Too Big to Succeed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A37 (arguing that reducing the “size and 
scope” of the banks “would restore competitive balance to our economic system”). 
  Moreover, she con-
tends that self-regulation might be able to do the job that the Dodd-
Frank Act assigned to a council of senior regulators—regulation de-
8
See generally GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM:  A FRAMEWORK FOR FINAN-
CIAL STABILITY 34-38 (2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy 
%20page/G30Report.pdf (describing various models of regulation and urging the im-
portance of a central bank in regulation); GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FI-
NANCIAL SUPERVISION:  APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 12-
16 (2008), available at http://www.economicpopulist.org/files/us_fsi_banking_ 
G30%20Final%20Report%2010-3-08.pdf (same). 
9
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REG-
ULATORY STRUCTURE 11-13 (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/documents/Blueprint.pdf (recommending a merger of current 
federal regulators to create a more unified regulator of futures and securities). 
10
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
11
After all, it could be that the highs of unconstrained American finance are worth 
the lows of busts and bubble bursts when compared with heavily regulated and sleepy 
financial sectors that drive much less growth—a model adopted in Canada, for example. 
12
Omarova decries the “self-perpetuating dynamic, putting the state and the in-
dustry on opposite sides of a regulatory arbitrage game” as “likely to increase complexi-
ty in the financial markets and exacerbate potential systemic risk.” Omarova, supra 
note 1, at 435-36. 
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signed to forestall systemically unsafe practices.13  In her view, the sine 
qua non of such self-regulation would be the creation of a “we feel-
ing,” the belief that if the financial industry participants do not hang 
together, then they will hang separately.  In competitive industries 
such communities of fate are difficult to find, but Omarova has found 
a couple:  the nuclear power industry is surpassingly interested in en-
suring that every nuclear power plant operator meets high safety stan-
dards, and by the same token, the chemical manufacturing industry 
after the Bhopal disaster has tried to ensure that none of its members 
causes similarly terrible releases of toxins.14
Could Wall Street police itself in the same way?  As Omarova 
notes, “[t]he global financial industry has a significant history of self-
regulation.”
 
15  She plausibly argues that finance, rather than its regula-
tors or its customers, is the regulatory least-cost avoider.  Financial in-
stitutions understand market complexity.  They can assess risks quickly.  
If they took their “we feeling” seriously enough, they might even be will-
ing to pool together to create some kind of self-insurance fund, obviat-
ing the need for Gordon and Muller’s regulatory solution.16
Moreover, Wall Street regulates itself quite a bit today, suggesting 
that the move from competitive industry to a “we feeling” might not 
be a very long one.  The SEC has branded exchanges and other capi-
tal-market-clearing institutions as self-regulatory organizations, or 
SROs, and for decades these organizations have been pressed into 
market-oversight service.
 
17
 
13
See Alvin C. Harrell, Teaching Consumer Law Part Five, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 
87, 95 (2011) (“The Dodd-Frank Act also provides for a separate Financial Stability 
Oversight council (FSOC), with authority over the safety and soundness of the finan-
cial system (S&S) (and authority to overturn a [Bureau of Consumer Financial Protec-
tion] rule if that rule threatens that S&S).”). 
  This experience, to be sure, has not put 
the exchanges at the front and center of guaranteeing systemic stabili-
14
Omarova points to the Three Mile Island and Bhopal accidents as  
triggers that made the nuclear power and chemical manufacturing industries  
. . . [the] targets of intense public criticism and attacks by environmentalists 
and other social groups.  It is under conditions of extreme uncertainty and 
mounting pressure from the outside that private industry actors perceive the 
greatest need to relate their industry’s norms to its broader, and changing, 
context.  
Omarova, supra 1,. at 451. 
15
Id. at 464. 
16
See Gordon & Muller, supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining the au-
thors’ proposal for a $1 trillion bailout fund). 
17
Omarova, supra note 1, at 465-68. 
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ty, the issue that Omarova believes self-regulation might also be able 
to address, but the experience surely counts for something.18
For these reasons, Omarova’s account is plausible.  It is consistent 
with a movement in regulation toward enhancing regulatory capacity 
by using a private sector multiplier that extends the reach of public 
sector policing.
 
19
Furthermore, from a scholarly perspective, Omarova’s account 
makes the occasionally evanescent New Governance scholarship tang-
ible.  New Governance “views regulation as a reflexive, iterative, and 
dialogical process and ‘identifies ongoing deliberation as the most le-
gitimate and most effective mechanism for making decisions in com-
plex organizational structures.’”
  The hope is that by encouraging the adoption of in-
ternal controls, by requiring the use of gatekeepers like lawyers and 
accountants, and so on, the private sector can do much more to en-
sure that regulations enjoy compliance than can publicly employed 
inspectors and enforcement officers alone. 
20
But I still worry about the potential of the community of fate, es-
pecially given the costs of cooperation in a purportedly competitive 
industry.  I offer five critiques. 
  It is often difficult to understand 
what this means, amid all the iterative processes and dialogic ben-
chmarking.  Omarova’s suggestions show the way for New Governance 
to actually take root. 
First, self-regulation can lead to anticompetitive cartelization, a 
particular concern in the financial markets.  After all, NASDAQ bro-
kers and dealers fixed bid-ask spreads for decades in the heart of a 
purportedly liquid and competitive market.21
 
18
Omarova also notes that the financial industry has self-regulated derivatives for 
many years through the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.  ,Id. at 444. 
  Industry-generated 
compliance efforts create barriers to entry no matter what industry is 
involved.  But in finance, which has been accused of less-than-clearly 
19
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:  Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692 (2003) (“[A] 
management-based approach requires firms to engage in their own planning and in-
ternal rule-making efforts that are supposed to aim toward the achievement of specific 
public goals.” (citations omitted)). 
20
Omarova, supra note 1,. at 427 (quoting Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Com-
pliance, and Principles-Based Securities Litigation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27-28 (2008)).  
21
“[N]ot only did private plaintiffs awake the federal government to . . . price col-
lusion that the government had previously ignored, but also pulled the principal labor-
ing oar in advancing this case.”  Arthur M. Kaplan, Antitrust as a Public-Private Partner-
ship:  A Case Study of the Nasdaq Litigation, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 111, 112 (2001) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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procompetitive cooperation many times in the past few decades, a 
blessing of self-regulation warrants some trepidation. 
Second, if the impetus for the creation of a community of fate in a 
competitive industry is the threat that a single accident at a single 
business might destroy an entire sector, then we must ask whether 
finance is well analogized to such an industry.  The welfare of firms in 
the financial industry may, in fact, be far more correlated than that of 
firms in the nuclear power and chemical production industries.  In 
finance, one panic will affect many companies, as has been the case 
for centuries.22
Third, it is difficult to reconcile the story Omarova tells about reg-
ulatory capture
  The paradigm is not that bad news for one firm makes 
it hard for others to do business, regardless of their fundamental 
business plan; it is that bad news can make one, one hundred, or 
many hundreds of firms insolvent at once.  This is contrary to a situa-
tion in which the litigation, compensation, and political risk at one 
firm will create public relations—but not necessarily real—problems 
in comparable institutions.  Because panics result in real insolvency 
for many financial intermediaries, rescues have often followed these 
panics.  And if the correlation and centrality of finance make rescue 
likely, it is possible that, rather than acting as a community of self-
policing fate, the incentives and structure of finance will lead the in-
dustry to act as a community of moral hazard.  Creating the desired 
incentive structure is difficult because there are real differences be-
tween the correlation of risks in finance and in industries facing terri-
ble industrial accidents, such as the nuclear power and chemical pro-
duction industries. 
23—where regulators often do the bidding of the 
finance industry—with a story that the industry will begin to police it-
self because of the in terrorem effect of the regulator.24  Financial regu-
lators unquestionably have the power to destroy recalcitrant or inept 
members of the industry.25
 
22
See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:  A HISTORY OF FI-
NANCIAL CRISES 14-20 (1978) (outlining the model of a typical financial crisis); CAR-
MEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. RUGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:  EIGHT CENTURIES 
OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 25-29 (2009) (discussing the vulnerability of national economies 
to debt intolerance). 
  But they have often been unwilling to act.  
23
Omarova, supra note 1, at 463-64. 
24
Id. at 486. 
25
See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 100 (2010) (noting 
that “in the wake of the crisis, [Congress and President Obama] passed and signed 
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Despite the Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to ban bailouts in the future, in a 
crisis it is very hard for the government to leave the financial commu-
nity to its own protections.26
Fourth, one of Omarova’s preconditions for self-regulation is a 
Glass-Steagall-like cabining of the wholesale industry (which trades 
market instruments of varying complexity) and the retail industry 
(which funds itself through individual deposits).
  And if the shotgun behind the door is so 
rarely employed, will the incentives to self-regulate really add up? 
27  Such a separation 
is not New Governance, although Omarova herself admits that the 
best self-regulatory schemes are paired with command and control by 
effective regulators.28
Fifth, will pooled insurance, one of the mechanisms that, Omarova 
proposes, a self-policing effort might create,
  But perhaps this admission is a useful caution 
about the power of the community of fate model. 
29
I nonetheless find Omarova’s suggestions to be thoughtful.  The 
financial industry is familiar with some degree of internal coopera-
tion, after all.  And furthermore, I am unconvinced by the strongest 
proponents of capture.  The Treasury Department, for all its problems 
during the last financial crisis, seriously punished one of the five larg-
 actually work?  Firms 
can write off insurance as a cost of doing business and pass that cost 
along to customers, after which financial intermediaries may get in-
volved with more and more hazardous activities because of the pros-
pect of insurance.  Nor is moral hazard the only problem.  In financial 
markets, counterparties present risk—the possibility that the counter-
party will be unable to meet its contractual obligations because of in-
solvency.  That risk, one would think, would give market participants 
incentives to carefully monitor one another for long-term stability.  
But the very real incentives of counterparty risk, which in many ways 
already created its own community of fate for financial intermediaries, 
failed to preclude the most recent financial crisis.  One wonders 
whether more of a Wall Street “we feeling” would be more likely to do 
any better. 
 
legislation designed to enhance and broaden the government’s power to destroy 
through resolution.”). 
26
See Kim Krawiec, On Second Doses and Delegations, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 21, 
2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/07/on-second-doses-and-delegations.html 
 (arguing that Dodd-Frank does not completely tie the executive branch’s hands). 
27
Omarova, supra note 1, at 475-82.  
28
See id. at 416, 445-46. 
29
Id. at 481 (“The introduction of a mandatory system of mutual self-insurance 
among these firms is another measure likely to incentivize private firms in the whole-
sale financial services industry to see themselves as a community of fate.”). 
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est investment banks for falling insolvent (it forced the sale of Bear 
Stearns at $2 per share) and let another (Lehman Brothers) fail.30
Finally, there is historical precedent for Omarova’s approach to 
financial reform.  She may be reinvigorating an old approach to deal-
ings with financial panics, as well as outlining a new one.  J.P. Morgan, 
after all, led an industry rescue to forestall the banking crisis of 1907.
  
That means that two of the five largest investment banks in the United 
States were killed under close government oversight.  Omarova re-
cognizes that “we feelings” are created by threats and the prospect of 
industry-wide devastation, absent high, self-enforced industry stan-
dards of safety.  While collapsing financial market bubbles do not pro-
vide the same sort of threats of industry-wide devastation (at least not 
threats unaccompanied by bailouts), it is possible that government 
regulation here is a bit more of a daunting prospect. 
31  
Morgan learned his craft in a banking industry that, of its own accord, 
adopted regional clearinghouses in an effort to avert the regular 
banking panics of the nineteenth century.32  Morgan led the 1907 res-
cue with assistance from the Secretary of the Treasury, but not with a 
government bailout.33
 
  Although Omarova bases the theoretical un-
derpinnings of her approach on the recent New Governance litera-
ture, she is also reaching back to reinvigorate a long-standing model 
of financial regulation.  And that approach—new ideas, but with a 
track record—is a pretty good basis for reform. 
 
 Preferred Citation:  David Zaring, Response, Fateful Bankers, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 303 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/05-2011/Zaring.pdf. 
 
 
30
See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 480, 493 (characterizing the Bear Stearns 
sale as a punishment and the Lehman Brothers collapse as an intentional move to send 
a message). 
31
See FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., PANIC OF 1907, at 5-8 (2011), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/panicof1.pdf (narrating the story of the 1907 
crash, including the role of clearinghouses therein). 
32
Id.; see also ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907:  LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 57-64 (2007) (describing the develop-
ment and significance of clearinghouses in the 1907 crash).  
33
FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., supra note 31, at 6-7. 
